Abstract. In the current deregulated Telecom scenario the number of network operators and service providers is rapidly increasing. The resulting competition generates the need for a exible resource management. In parallel, the fast growth of the electronic commerce opens a new market where operators can o er`network bandwidth' commodities. In this dynamic context, the traditional architecture of Telecom networks needs to be evolved. For that purpose, the integration of economic principles with software technology is a strategic contribution to this evolution. In particular, market-skilled software agents seem to be one of the most promising paradigms. In this paper we describe an agent-based system for the e-commerce of IP-bandwidth, and we show how the integration of this system within a network management platform would automate the advertisement of goods, the monitoring of market trends, the pricing and the con guration of network resources.
Introduction
The idea of deploying economic mechanisms for a variety of applications, has been actively deployed in several elds. With the Internet providing a powerful and worldwide accessible medium for communicating and advertising business information, Internet-based commerce is ourishing. Virtual market-places facilitate in fact commerce transactions by bringing together buyers and sellers 7] 1 . Many service and network providers are then considering, and in some cases already deploying 2 , electronic market places for o ering services, such as for instance ber and satellite bandwidth, IP telephony minutes, etc. Even though 1 According to recent market research reports of Meta Group and Forrester Research 200 and 350 billion US$ e-commerce sales are expected by the year 2000 respectively in Europe and the States. 2 At least seven bandwidth brokers are already active on the Web. See 9] for more details.
this kind of business is more and more popular, the risk of failing or simply not being e ective is not negligible. Several researchers believe that a smart generation of e-commerce would reduce these risks by integrating market-based techniques within agent technology (see 12] , 3] for good examples). Automated agents can follow more e ciently speci c strategies, evaluate and optimise the utility of speci c actions, such as bidding, o ering, etc. On the other hand, the integration process reveals the limitations of software techniques and the need to modify sometimes the economic mechanisms from their original formulation.
This paper reports the experience learned by developing and implementing a multi-agent auction house, the IP-market, for trading`IP-bandwidth goods'. The novelty of our approach is in the automatic integration of an Intelligent Resource Manager, IRM, within the auction house on one side and within the network management platform on the other. While, some existing Internet-based auction houses allows human network operators to enter o ers, our paradigm automates the overall negotiation process. From the o ering phase to the end of trading transactions, software entities autonomously act on behalf of humans. This is indeed possible because of the integration of the IRM within the network resources management and because of the agent communication structure supported by the IP-market. Another major contribution of this work is on the use of a standard agent-to-agent communication and standard agent interaction protocols. This renders the IP-market highly open and easy to access, encouraging potential buyers and sellers to enter the electronic commerce. The main aim of this paper is to describe the architecture of the auction house we have developed. This description shows how the integration of this system within a network management platform has the potential of automating the advertisement of goods, the negotiation, the monitoring of market trends, the pricing and the con guration of network resources. Furthermore, authors hope to stimulate and contribute to a productive discussion about the concrete challenges for the success of the e-commerce of Telecom services.
Section 2 gives some background on market-based approach to QoS and bandwidth allocation in the networking eld and brie y reviews auctioning principles. Section 3 describes the IP-market simulator architecture and its main components. More focus on agent interactions and on the lesson learned is given in Section 4. It is also discussed the potential of integrating negotiating agents with a network management platform. Section 5 concludes the paper with some comments on future work.
Background
There have been several e orts to exploit markets for distributed applications that need to coordinate a set of autonomous entities 8], 12]. The main motivations come from deep investigations done by economists about the problem of coordinating multiple agents in a societal structure 5]. The key point is that economics o ers mechanisms that produce globally desirable results, avoiding central coordination, and imposing minimal communication requirements 15].
The auction model is a major paradigm which has been more and more intensively deployed. Many di erent types of auctions are appearing on the Internet, where electronic auction houses allow the sale of a big variety of products. These virtual institutions are electronic environments where certain kinds of goods are traded under explicit trading conventions.
Some previous market-based approaches to QoS and bandwidth allocation for Telecom have been analysed. Gibney et al. are exploring the use of a`twolevel' auctioning mechanism for routing service demands in Telecom networks 8]. However, the main assumption in their work is that a negotiation, i.e., a double auction, is started by a request coming from an end-user. Furthermore, the research is more focused on e ciently distributing the control of network resources, than on automating the potential of selling Telecom services through the use virtual market-places. Kubawara, et al. developed a market model for multi agent resource allocation 6]. In the market there are`activity-agents', i.e., the buyers, and`resource-agents', i.e., the sellers of the network resources. Bandwidth on physical ATM links, i.e., ATM channels, is o ered. An`equilibratory' approach is investigated: the market calculates the supply and the demand volume equilibrium (remark that no auctions take place). An interesting part of this work is the de nition of sellers' and buyers' strategies. In this market model a fundamental assumption is that sellers do not know the prices of the resources at other locations when they determine the prices. This is not always the case in a real market, but it is a realistic assumption for participants that rst enter the market.
In the MACH project 3 , we have developed the IP-market simulator, a virtual market place for investigating the usability of the auction mechanism for selling IP bandwidth with given Quality of Service, QoS. In this scenario, IP Network Operators are the sellers and all potential customers, i.e., nal end-users, IP brokers and all kind of Value Added Service Providers (voice, video, multimedia), are the buyers. The integration of seller agents within the underlying network infrastructure eliminates the need of human intervention for o ering goods to a virtual market-place and allows the automation of network resources' negotiation and pricing. Furthermore, the use of a standard agent communication language and of standard interaction protocols guarantee an open and accessible electronic auction house.
Electronic Auctions
The concept of auction is very common and almost everybody is familiar with this kind of trading mechanism, but the simplicity is only apparent. Smart auction principles and bidding strategies have being analysed and studied in various ways, in order to maximise the revenue. The bibliography goes from more theoretical and general principles 1], to very speci c studies related to auctions for 3 More information about MACH, MArket meCHanism for selling on-demand IP bandwidth, are available at: http://liawww.ep .ch/ calisti/MACH selling speci c products, such as wine, second hand automobiles, sh, construction projects, etc. Electronic auctions are becoming more and more popular due to basically three main factors. First, they represent an alternative way to make business o ering a di erent paradigm to implement negotiation, which is a vital moment in the commerce of all types of goods. Second, auction mechanisms are better known: deep studies of how to optimise auction protocols and strategies promise e cient results 12]. Finally, the success of the Internet and the development of the e-commerce give to auctions a sort of natural environment, where a larger number of potential customers and suppliers can settle business transactions in a shorter time. There are qualitatively di erent auction settings depending on how bidders evaluate a good. In private auctions the evaluation is not dependent on external factors and it is based on private bidder's information. Auctions are non-private if the valuation of bids is decided upon private considerations and valuations of others' bids. If the value is partly dependent on other's values the auction is also called correlated value auction. Whether the value is completely dependent on other's bid valuations the process is identi ed as a common value auction. Considering the IP-bandwidth market we can have di erent types of auction settings whether the bidder is a nal end-user or a potential re-seller. The auction protocol establishes the order in which prices are quoted and the manner in which bids are tendered. The major one-sided auction protocols are basically four: English, First-price sealed-bid, Vickrey and Dutch. A good list of references is given in 13] and a good review of the protocols is given in 7] and 12]. The IP-market supports the rst three types of protocols. For deciding the auction strategy several aspects should be considered. First, a seller has to choose an auction type, i.e., the protocol, so he must predict the behaviour of bidders. Second, a buyer makes an estimation of his own value of the good and evaluates what other bidders will o er. A seller can in uence auction results by revealing information about the good. An optimal strategy from a sellers perspective is to reveal information, since in general the more information a bidder has, the more a price moderation e ect of winner's curse is reduced 12]. The revenue-equivalence theorem 10] demonstrates that, under the assumption of private value, all four basic auction types produce the same expected value to the auctioneer when bidders are risk-neutral and symmetric. However, this theoretical result does not apply in many real situations. From the bidder's perspective the kind of auction protocol has the e ect of revealing or not information in the course of the auction. At some point in advance, bidders must decide the maximum amount they will bid, based on their own valuation of the good and their prior beliefs about the valuations of other bidders. If useful information are revealed during the auction, bidding strategies can take into account this additional input. Therefore, in the IP-market a negotiation strategy is coded into agents using a set of rules specifying how and when they should bargain and/or accept a deal, i.e., rule-based approach.
3 The IP-market architecture
In the IP-market is not a network operator that directly o ers the IP bandwidth, but an intermediary, the auctioneer, who calls for tenders and adjudicates the purchase to the highest bid. The IP-market is expected to be fair and neutral in respect to both sellers and buyers: it is a third trusted party that guarantees standard and known trading mechanisms to all participants in the same way.
In order to cast the IP bandwidth commerce in terms of a computational market, it is necessary to specify: (1) The goods traded. (2) The buyer and the seller agents' characteristics. (3) The markets structure.
Modelling the goods
At a very abstract level the type of good o ered in our market is a`certain amount of bandwidth with some QoS guarantees'. Referring to the Di erentiated Service framework 4], we abstract the complexity of QoS speci cation by identifying three levels of quality: gold, silver and bronze. Gold stands for virtual leased lines, silver stands for better than best-e ort, bronze symbolises the classical best-e ort. Di erent entities in the market can have di erent internal representations of the market's goods, however, for a common global understanding, a minimal agreement on common terms and expressions is needed. This implies to consider which kind of internal representation of the goods every entity has, and to decide about a common ontology to refer when speaking about the same concepts. The common representation of the good expresses an agreement between the buyer and the seller. The agreement that the service which the customer bids for, i.e., what the customer wants, corresponds to what the seller is committing to provide, what the provider supplies. This is formalised by the Service Level Agreements, SLAs 14] . Since SLAs depend on the nature of services provided by a network operator, and since we are far from having a standard and common way of expressing SLAs, the big challenge, for software developers willing to implement agents reasoning about SLAs is how represent them. In the following we describe a good's representation that is valid in the IP-market, however, the SLA representation is not covered in this paper. Network provider's good representation. The IP network has been modelled as a set of nodes interconnected by links. The nodes represent routers and/or switches in the network. The links represent the connections existing between the nodes. Every link can be characterised by several parameters, such as the price, available bandwidth, end-to-end delay, bit loss rate, etc. In Figure 1 two di erent levels of abstractions are shown: simple links (e.g., a-a1) and end-to-end paths (e.g., a-e).
Market's good representation. Every good o ered to the IP-market must be described in terms of: End-points, i.e., source and destination, of the connection. Asking-price, that is the starting price of the good. Resale-price: this parameter expresses the demand for the good on the IP-market, i.e., the value at which the good could be eventually re-sold. This value is xed for the duration of an auction and is known before the auction. It can be de ned according to the market history or the auction history, or it may be de ned in terms of external supply considerations. The resale price can be either set by the seller, or de ned as a function of other market-variables or set according to other conventions. O er timeout, i.e., the time the o er will be valid for. Amount of bandwidth, that is o ered on the connection. QoS level, i.e., bronze, silver or golden. Time at which the service will start and will stop to be available.
Buyer's good representation. The good's view, that a buyer has, is built upon the information that the IP-market makes publicly available. Hence, a good is a certain amount of IP bandwidth with speci c QoS guarantees, between two speci c end-points, that is o ered at an initial starting price and that has a certain resale-price. { For every auction process that takes place in the market there is an auctioneer agent, AA, that governs it. The auctioneer is responsible for receiving bids from buyers, evaluating them and determining the winner. In the end it also noti es the winner and the seller about the results of the auction.
{ The IP-Market core is the central brain of the overall simulator, and it supplies the fundamental mechanisms required for an auction process and for coordinating parallel auctions with other market activities, see Figure 2 . Standard mechanisms of access to the market are supplied through the use of standard agent interactions. Agent's bidding behaviour Fundamentally, two di erent kinds of potential buyers can access the IP-market: end-customers and resellers customers. The rst ones want to buy IP-bandwidth for a private use, i.e., they require such amount of bandwidth independently on what other customers are requiring from the market and they will not re-sell the good to the market. For this kind of buyers we have a private value auction model. The non-nal customers are the ones that will eventually re-sell the IP-bandwidth. In this case the bidder's value of a good depends partly on its own preferences and partly on others' values. This in the case of non-private value settings. Under the same auction protocol these two kind of buyers deploy di erent strategies.
Every BA knows about the preferences of the end-user is acting on behalf of. The set of preferences is entered at the creation of every BA, so that a user pro le is generated. Whenever an auction is activated, a BA evaluates if taking part or not to the auction by comparing the user's preferences with the characteristics of the new good o ered. If the BA decides to enter the auction, the strategy will be based on a set of rules that take into account other user's preferences parameters and historical data about passed auctions.
The IP-market core
In the IP-market simulator several parallel auctions can take place. Every auction process runs in a separate virtual auction room, that is managed by a di erent AA. Having dedicated entities for managing distinct auctions increases the scalability and the e ciency of the market. All communications concerning a speci c auction are in fact handled in a way which is totally transparent to other market activities. While an auction is going on, the market can for instance accept new incoming goods, register new buyers, etc.
In order to access the market-place and in order to be able to participate to trading transactions, seller and buyer agents need to register within the market.
A registered SA can then o er items to the market, and a registered BA can subscribe to participate to one or several auctions. The identity of every auction's participants is kept con dential. The auctioneer discloses the identity of both winner and seller to the other one only at the end of an auction. Afterwards, the two parts directly contact each other to establish a contract 4 { Scheduling auctions and noti cation of potential bidders, i.e., registered buyers, about the current active auctions. Di erent mechanisms can be used for auction scheduling: regular schedule (e.g., xed appointments during the day) or asynchronous auctions (i.e., whenever the good is made available the market can open an auction). Registered buyers can be either noti ed by the market, or they can pro-actively ask which are the active auctions.
{ Displaying of all active auctions, registered buyer and seller agents. { Creation of auctioneer agents, one for every auction that is activated. { Routing of all messages to and from agents that have been registered with the market. { Auction's winner computation and participants noti cation about the auction results (these tasks are performed by the auctioneer agent). If a single item is sold within every auction, the winner computation is not a very difcult task. However, whether multiple items are o ered during the same auction the complexity of the winner determination increases. If the goal is to maximise the revenue the optimal winner determination becomes NP- complete 11] . The combinatorial auction infrastructure is currently under construction.
{ Closing auction phase. The auction is successful when a winner has been selected and the bid is conformant to the prior seller requirements. Both winner and seller are expected to con rm that they accept the auction results. In order to deploy historical results about passed auctions, every auctioneer saves the auction data in text les. This data structures can then be used by both seller and buyer agents for future speculations.
The current IP-market version needs more work on security aspects. While a login-name and a password can be enough for a simulator, a real market would need to verify the truthfulness of registration information supplied by buyers and sellers. The security issue is a common open problem for many e-commerce applications. Bringing agents to a common secure place would enable a better control of both con dentiality and authenticity. 4 No automatic contracting phase is enabled in the current version of the IP-market. 4 An Open and Inter-operable Market A preliminary and fundamental feature of an open and inter-operable marketplace is the capability of supporting communications. For that purpose, two main issues need to be solved: (1) messages have to be physically delivered to the right destination, (2) delivered messages need to be understood.
The rst aspect implies that the IP-market is capable of addressing and routing messages to remote entities. For that aim, a unique way to identify all agents in the market is implemented. At the registration of a new participant a control mechanism veri es and guarantees the uniqueness of agent identi ers. Once a message has been delivered, full inter-operability can be reached if the message can be conveniently processed. Inter-operability is rst reached through the use of standard agent interaction protocols. For every communication phase, i.e., starting auction, bidding, closing auction, etc., a speci c protocol is selected. Some standard FIPA protocols have been adopted and some new ones have been de ned. A second level of inter-operability is guaranteed by a common agent communication language. The common market-place language is FIPA-ACL 2]. The rst element of an ACL message is the name of the performative, the following part is a sequence of parameters that can occur in any order in the message. In particular the :protocol eld speci es the expected sequence of performatives for the agents interaction. The :content eld of a FIPA ACL message refers to whatever the communicative acts apply to. Inter-operability is also reached through the use of a common content language. In the IP-market an ad hoc common language capable to express actions, objects, and propositions has been developed and deployed. An action is an activity that can be performed by some agent. An object in the language de nes an identi able thing (with a name). A proposition states that a sentence in a language is true or false. By convention, agents accessing the IP-market use this common language. In addition, an implicit ontology has been referred. An ontology is an explicit speci cation of the structure of a certain domain. This includes a vocabulary for referring to the subject area, and a set of logical statements expressing the constraints existing in the domain and restricting the implementation of the vocabulary. The IP-market ontology provides a vocabulary for representing and communicating knowledge about IP bandwidth goods and about auctioning aspects. Furthermore, a set of relationships and properties that hold for the entities denoted by that vocabulary has been xed.
Successful tests have proved the inter-operability between the IP-market and externally developed seller agents. An IRM, i.e. seller agent, running at Swisscom in Bern, has successfully registered with the IP-market running at the EPFL in Lausanne. The connection has been established through the use of Java messages over TCP-IP sockets. Then, the IRM o ered IP-bandwidth between di erent cities in Switzerland with randomly generated bandwidth and QoS characteristics. Buyers agents, previously created and running at in at the EPFL, registered for active auctions matching with their preferences. The pre-designed and standard interaction protocols and the common terms used during all agent conver-sations have guaranteed full interconnectivity, so that auctions have successfully been concluded.
Implications for Market-Skilled Agents
The complexity of implementing and deploying multi-agent systems is ampli ed when the aim is to develop market-skilled agents. The more traditional issues of using and building software agents, such as for instance addressing schemes, communication aspects, interaction protocols, etc., are furtherly complicated by the introduction of economic mechanisms. Speci c timing rules and policies, that can be di cult to implement in a virtual environment, must be supplied. Furthermore, an important communication overhead, that increases as the number of agents scales up, can take place. Since agents have to be capable of reasoning quickly and adapting to dynamically changing environment, the introduction of a more robust computation support is also required.
Based on our concrete experience, the synchronisation of distributed entities is one of the most complex aspects. In electronic auctions larger delays and deadlines must be considered because of electronic communications overhead. Although,`time-stamps' or`counters' associated with the messages can help to process them in the right order, there is always the primordial problem of synchronising distributed software systems. A possible solution is a resynchronisation with the Auctioneer Agent at the beginning of every auction. Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that messages are lost before being delivered to the recipient. Because of this risk, that could for instance leads to deadlocks or other types of inconsistencies, the deployed interaction protocols have been provided with timing mechanisms to ensure the termination of ongoing conversations. Due to the kind of good that is traded in the IP-market the timing speci cations are even more strict. The service availability is in fact related to the network resources availability on providers' networks. An o er is made on the basis of predictions about the future network state, which implies the exchange of several ows of information at the network management level.
Integrating e-commerce Capabilities within a Network
The Intelligent Resource Manager, IRM, automates all interactions between the IP-market and the network infrastructure. The interaction with the network management platform on one side and with the IP-market on the other allows the integration of the e-commerce with traditional network management functionalities such as planning, con guration, resource allocation, monitoring, etc. This kind of architecture leads to advantages for both customers and providers. For customers, since there is a third trusted party controlling all trading transactions: the IP-market auction house supplies in fact standard and open mechanisms for all potential participants. For providers, since such an architecture would (1) automate the advertisement of`Telecom goods', according to network resources availability, (2) accelerate various steps of the service provisioning process, (3) provide an alternative way to sell bandwidth surplus and (4) support an automatic pricing mechanism through the auction paradigm. Fig. 3 . The IRM integrates e-commerce with network management functionalities.
Conclusion
This paper reports the experience learnt during the implementation of the IPmarket, an electronic auction house for selling`IP-bandwidth goods'. A particular attention is devoted to concrete issues faced for developing an open, inter-operable, exible and scalable virtual market place.
{ Open and inter-operable: A standard communication language has been adopted, as well as standard interaction protocols.
{ Flexible: Several auction protocols are available, i.e., Vickrey, English and First-Price Sealed-Bid. In addition, for auction scheduling two di erent mechanisms have been implemented: regular schedule and asynchronous schedule. The auction advertisement can be either automatic, i.e., once an agent register with the market a noti cation of active auctions is received, or triggered by an agent request.
{ Scalable: The creation of dedicated auctioneers for every auction process, allows for a more e cient management of agent communications and message exchanges. The major contribution of this work is in showing the feasibility of an automated interaction between buyers and sellers for the e-commerce of Telecom services. Secondly, as stated above, the deployment of standard agent interaction`instruments' enables our system to be open and easy to access. Finally, the IP-market formalism abstracts the networking complexity by providing à customer-friendly' view of IP end-to-end connections with QoS guarantees. Future work on the IP-market simulator includes transferring the platform over the Web, enhancing the system with XML-based descriptions of the goods traded, and integrating multi-items auctions facilities.
